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This thesis work is aimed at developing understanding of the hash functions and algorithms being 
used in blockchain technologies Bitcoin in comparison to Ethereum and private blockchain hash 
functions. This study attempts to answer one fundamental research question: “What considerations 
are important in assessing blockchain cryptographic security, with an emphasis on hash functions”. 
 The study was carried out qualitatively using a desk research approach and combining this 
approach with using two public blockchains-based cryptocurrencies; Ethereum and Bitcoin as case 
studies. The research aims to provide a holistic view of blockchain cryptographic security 
comparing Bitcoin and Ethereum as use cases, and thus providing a consolidated document which 
students studying cryptography can access to obtain a better understanding of what is involved in 
blockchain security. From an academic perspective, the research aims at providing a model which 
can be used in assessing what is important to consider in the cryptographic security of blockchains.  
Three main categories of factors considered were presented in the proposed model which were 
strategical factors, complexity attributes and technical drivers. This results in a base crucial metrics 
such as absence of secret seeds, efficiency of verification, preimage collision resistance, fixed 
output size, low collision probability, and even distribution of preimages in output. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Hash Functions, Digital Signatures, Consensus Algorithms, Bitcoin, 
Ethereum, Hashing Security Factors  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Background 
“A violent ocean filled with gold plated fishes” - this effectively describes the current technological 
trend in the form of blockchain and crypto-currencies, which has enormous profit potential, but 
also has so many uncertainties and potential risks which can prove fatal economically if they are 
not considered. In 2014 alone, according to the leaked Mt. Gox "crisis strategy draft" document, a 
Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, filed for bankruptcy after losing more than 700,000 Bitcoins worth 
over 400 million USD (Kaushal et al., 2017).  In general, the applications of blockchain technology 
and their associated value has increased threefold since 2016, and the sustainability of such steep 
and rapid increments concerns sceptical observers and users. This creates a need to understand the 
core and founding principles these technologies are built upon in order to be able to design efficient 
risk management strategies and processes. Having such strategies in place would help mitigate 
losses and circumvent huge waves of financial crisis for cryptocurrency miners and users.  
 The case studies of this research, namely Ethereum and Bitcoin cryptocurrencies are built upon 
the foundation of blockchain technologies which are distributed peer to peer public ledger systems 
and which according to De Meijer (2015) has the potential of changing the financial world, with a 
wide and diverse range of implementations in digital payments and smart contracts. Hence, the 
research on cryptocurrencies have an associated and comparable impact on blockchain 
technologies as well. 
1.2 Research contribution 
As the name implies, a blockchain in very simple terms is a chain of blocks which have data stored 
in them, and essentially a distributed ledger or record of transactions with each block in the chain 
cryptographically linked to its predecessor as in Figure 1. 
                                                                          
Figure 1: A Blockchain with “n+1” blocks 
The concepts discussed in this thesis are topics which have been around for quite some time and 
thus there has been ongoing discussions in previous literary works concerning these concepts such 
Block-0                                                                               Block-1
                                                                              
§§ 
Block-n
                                                                              
§§ 
. . . 
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as blockchain, Bitcoin, digital signatures, hash functions and time-stamping techniques dating 
back as far as 1991 in Haber’s work “How to time-stamp a digital document” (Haber and Stornetta, 
1991).  However, research seeking to fuse these concepts together remains scarce. 
 This study attempts to answer one fundamental research question which is; what considerations 
are important in assessing blockchain cryptographic security particularly hash functions? The 
study uses public blockchain systems; Ethereum and Bitcoin as case studies. 
 For the purpose of this research, Bitcoin and Ethereum cryptocurrencies are profoundly studied 
with a qualitative desk research approach to a case study methodology due to the diverse nature 
and relatively young age of the topic area. Ethereum and Bitcoin were selected as case studies as 
these represented two major differing implementations regarding consensus and decision making 
while maintaining some similarity in certain areas such as digital signing. This enabled obtaining 
an in-depth understanding of security of hash functions which Bitcoin and Ethereum uses as well 
as justification behind their choices, and its interactions with other aspects of the technology. 
 This research aims to provide a holistic view of blockchain cryptographic security, and thus 
providing a consolidated document which students studying cryptography can access to obtain 
better understanding of what is involved in blockchain security and hence be able to have a positive 
impact in the design and implementations of blockchain technology systems and their 
corresponding risk mitigation processes. From an academic perspective, the research aims to 
provide a model which can be used in assessing what is important to consider in the security of 
blockchain technology. 
1.3 Research organization 
This literary work is organized into six main sections. In the first section, the thesis was introduced 
with a summary of the research motivations and the research’s contributions to the academic and 
practical audience. In chapter two, the basic mathematical notations utilized in this study, as well 
as an overview of the mathematical structures and functions which form the core of how 
blockchain cryptography were introduced. These provided a mathematical basis to build upon in 
later chapter, particularly in chapter five. Similarly, a brief review of the previous literary works 
pertaining blockchain technology was provided in later sections of chapter two and served as an 
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introduction to the key blockchain sub-topics. Chapter three provided an explanation to the 
methodological choices of this research. 
 In chapter four of this literary work, as a prelude to blockchain cryptography, a structural analysis 
of blockchains was presented. Subsequently, in chapter five, the main concepts which form the 
core of blockchain security and privacy were introduced with detailed explanation of hashing and 
digital signature algorithms. Cryptocurrencies; Bitcoin and Ethereum, were explored to a greater 
extent in chapter six, and their cryptographic security, internal structure and innerworkings were 
discussed. The intended goal of chapter six was to provide a deeper understanding of the chosen 
cryptocurrencies and reasoning behind the cryptographic choices in an attempt to extract some 
considerations which could be generalized for other blockchain-based systems. This culminated 
in one of the main goals of this research which is the creation of an assessment model for 
cryptographic hash functions.  
4 
 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Mathematical notations and preliminary concepts 
The core mathematical concepts discussed in this research requires some knowledge of basic 
mathematics number theory principles and provides an overview of the mathematical structures 
and functions which form the core of blockchain security and privacy. 
Modular arithmetic is one of the basic concepts that is central to many mathematical calculations 
in blockchain technologies, such as finite fields and consequently elliptic curves which are defined 
over finite fields. This is used often when describing hashes and digital signatures in later chapters. 
Definition 2.1. Let “a”, “b”, and “m” be numbers from the set of all integers; “a” and “b” are 
congruent to the modulus “m” if they both have the same value “r” as a remainder when they are 
divided by “m” (Paar and Pelzl, 2010). 
∀ 𝒙, 𝒓, 𝒎 ∈  𝒁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝒎 >  0;  𝒙 ≡ 𝒓 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝒎) 𝑖𝑓 𝒎 | (𝒙 −  𝒓) 
For example, in modulo 7, 26 would be congruent to 5; that is, 26 ≡ 5 (mod 7), meaning if “26 – 
5” which is 21 can be divided by 7. 
Theorem 2.1. Basically, it is possible to write any integer x ∈ ℤ in the form;  
𝒙 = 𝒒 × 𝒎 + 𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝟎 ≤ 𝒓 < 𝒎    (𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒔, 𝒓 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟑, … , 𝒎 − 𝟏} ) 
The number 31 for example hence can be written as 31 = 4×7 + 3; and therefore 31 ≡ 3 (mod 7). 
Although in theory, for every given modulus there are infinitely many possible values for the 
remainder r, the same number 31 is congruent to 3 or 10 or 17 or -4 or -11 or other possibilities. 
Some other basic concepts which will be introduced here include groups, fields and elliptic curves. 
Definition 2.2. A group G is a set of elements which are closed under an operation “ ∘ “, such that 
𝒙 ∘ 𝒚 =  𝒛 ∈ 𝑮;  ∀ 𝒙, 𝒚 ∈ 𝑮 
 (𝒙 ∘ 𝒚 ) ∘ 𝒛 = 𝒙 (𝒚 ∘ 𝒛 ); ∀ 𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒛 ∈ 𝑮 (associativity) 
∃𝒆:  (𝒙 ∘ 𝒆 ) =  (𝒙 ∘ 𝒆 ) = 𝒙; ∀ 𝒙, 𝒚 ∈ 𝑮 
∃ 𝒙−𝟏:  (𝒙 ∘ 𝒙−𝟏 ) =  (𝒙 ∘ 𝒙−𝟏 ) = 𝒆; ∀𝒙 ∈ 𝑮 
If G is also commutative such that (x ∘ y) = (y ∘ x); ∀ x, y ∈ G, then G is an abelian group. 
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 It is useful to note that the order of an element in a group is the least integer “k” which the given 
element has to multiplied “k” times to obtain the identity element; x•x•x•…•x•x = xk = e. A cyclic 
group is one which has an element with the maximum order, and such element is called a primitive 
element or generator and can generate every element in the group (Paar and Pelzl, 2010). 
Definition 2.3. A Field is a set F, which satisfy the following properties: 
 (𝑭, + ) is a commutative group with an identity element 0 
 (𝑭 ∖ {0} , •  ) is a commutative group with an identity element 1 
 (𝒙 + 𝒚 )  • 𝒛 =  (𝒙 • 𝒛 ) +  (𝒚 • 𝒛 ) ∀ 𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒛 ∈ 𝑭 (distributivity ) 
A field is said to be a finite field or Galois field if it contains a finite number of elements (Menezes 
et al., 1996) and the number of elements in the field is called order of the field. 
The last concept to be introduced in this section is the elliptic curve (Paar and Pelzl, 2010). 
Definition 2.4 An elliptic curve E for cryptographic applications is the set of solutions to the 
following equation: 
𝒚𝟐 = 𝒙𝟑 + 𝒂𝒙 + 𝒃        /𝑭𝒑 
𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑 > 𝟑 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂, 𝒃 ∈ 𝑭𝒑 ∶  𝟒𝒂
𝟑 + 𝟐𝟕𝒃𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 (𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝒑) 
In order words, it is the set of pairs or points (x, y) ∈ Zp which satisfy the given equation above 
(y2 = x3 + ax + b; over a prime finite field 𝑭𝒑). Adding of points in an elliptic curve, takes two 
different forms for when the points being added are equal and when the points are different. If 
point P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), then (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) gives a new point R = (x3, y3), such that; 
𝒙𝟑 = 𝒔
𝟐 − 𝒙𝟏 − 𝒙𝟐   𝒂𝒏𝒅  𝒚𝟑 = 𝒔 (𝒙𝟏 − 𝒙𝟑 ) − 𝒚𝟏 
𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆  𝒔 =
 (𝒚𝟐 − 𝒚𝟏 )
 (𝒙𝟐 − 𝒙𝟏 )
 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝒑;  𝒊𝒇 𝑷 ≠ 𝑸 
𝒂𝒏𝒅  𝒔 =
 (𝟑𝒙𝟏
𝟐 + 𝒂 )
𝟐𝒚𝟏
  𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝒑;  𝒊𝒇 𝑷 = 𝑸 
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2.2 Blockchain 
This section aims to provide a light overview and introduction to the topics discussed at length in 
subsequent chapters, and to provide a glimpse into what has been said in the past and ongoing 
discussions by various authors on the key concepts discussed in this thesis. These concepts will be 
discussed at length from a more technical and security perspective in later chapters dedicated to 
each main topic grouping. 
  Blockchain was first conceptualized literally by Haber in their work on digital time stamping 
(Haber and Stornetta, 1991), before being put into implemented by Shatoshi in his white paper on 
Bitcoin cryptocurrency (Nakamoto, 2009) and subsequently popularized. Woodside et al. (2017) 
defined blockchain a digitized decentralized peer to peer transaction ledger and attempts to explain 
that blockchain has various underlying technologies and applications. Interestingly, Hanifatunnisa 
and Rahardjo (2017) described blockchain technologies as trustworthy service system to some 
non-trusting nodes/parties which ushers in the importance of security in blockchain technologies. 
2.3 Blockchain types 
According to Hanifatunnisa and Rahardjo (2017), blockchain technologies could be easily grouped 
into three main groups based on the way in which permissions are granted, and these main types 
are permissionless blockchain, public permissioned blockchain, and private permissioned 
blockchain. 
2.3.1 Permissioned blockchain 
The public version of permissioned blockchains have known and pre-approved participants/nodes 
and has the capability of identifying which participants are able to jointly modify or update the 
data in blocks and/or can control the data, and similarly there is a restriction on who can carry out 
transactions (Hanifatunnisa and Rahardjo, 2017). These sometimes are called federated or 
consortium blockchains. Private permissioned blockchains exclusively define who can participate 
in, access or view blockchain data and participation is strictly by invitation or permission, while 
in contrast public permissioned blockchain are at least accessible to the public for viewing. In 
general, the permissions control for a blockchain are defined by the security policy which they 
implement.  
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 Based on the description of permissioned blockchain provided by Sato and Himura (2018), it 
could be suggested that permissioned blockchains are a better fit for consortia, enabling the 
opportunity of cross-organizational sharing of information and participation in business 
transactions. This is reinforced by the description of smart contracts as user defined business logics 
used in executing business transactions and which are based on a distributed consensus algorithm 
or as Letourneau and Whelan (2017) describes computer codes which make simple transactions 
automatically take place. 
One good example of a permissioned blockchain is the Hyperledger Fabric. In their literary work, 
Pustišeka and Kos (2017) explained how the Hyperledger project came about as an attempt to have 
a framework of an “open source distributed ledger” which enables customizing via coding and 
allows using or plugging-into different or customized consensus algorithms. This makes it feasible 
to use the Hyperledger fabric as a private blockchain also in businesses.  
2.3.2 Permissionless blockchain 
In permissionless blockchain, participating in a consensus is generally open to anyone who is 
interested. Transaction blocks are generated by participants (miners) in what is called a mining 
process, and they validate the blocks and attach them to the chain using a consensus protocol (Dinh 
et al. 2017), and this creates security and performance challenges due to the byzantine nature of 
such a data structure, in the sense that there is an unreliable or incomplete knowledge as to if one 
of the nodes in the data structure has failed. 
 In Bitcoin there is an attempt to avoid this by indicating confirmation of a block only when its 
preceded by six confirmed blocks though this creates a security issue of its own where a powerful 
adversary can thus control a large proportion of transactions. Most permissionless blockchain 
systems tend to use a proof-of-work consensus technique to verify transactions. Two of the most 
popular permissionless blockchain technologies are Bitcoin and Ethereum, although they are quite 
different in implementation and have different uses as enumerated below.  
▪ Bitcoin: Böhme et al. (2015), describes Bitcoin as an “online communication protocol” 
which has making electronic payments possible as its main purpose while relying on 
cryptographic validation and use of private cryptographic keys to validate and keep 
transactions secure. As Khalilov and Levi (2018) points out, the address of Bitcoin users 
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are essentially hashes of their public key and Bitcoin uses blockchain as a public electronic 
ledger of all transactions which is shared between all users and verified by them. Hence, 
the blockchain itself serves as a single source of verification.    
▪ Ethereum: According to Vujičić et al. (2018) and Pontiveros et al. (2018), Ethereum is 
essentially a programmable blockchain platform upon which it is possible to create 
personalized ownership rules and transaction formats. It serves as an abstract layer upon 
which blockchain applications can be built upon. Thus, it can also be seen as a 
permissioned blockchain especially with it’s ability to offer user written Turing complete 
smart contracts (Dinh et al., 2017). 
2.4 Blockchain structure 
As Luo and Huang (2017) mentioned, a block is the “basic fundamental component of a 
blockchain” and is essentially a compilation of relevant pieces of information. A block in general 
contains a reference to the block before it, some of the previous transactions and a means of 
proving its validity by consensus (Kaushal et al. 2017). Due to the varying nature of the different 
types of blockchains available, this also results in their structural details being different (Li et al. 
2018). In the most basic form though, the fundamental structure of blockchain revolves around 
hashes.  
 For instance, in a proof of work based blockchain network, a node X creates a block by solving a 
cryptographic puzzle (that is, iterating through some hash functions until a certain format is 
obtained) and then other nodes validate the created block. The timestamping of each transaction 
in the chain depends on the nature and implementation of the blockchain. Usually, timestamping 
in blockchains are managed in a decentralized way, for example in the permissionless a hash value 
is computed for each block created and propagated to all nodes for validation and the hash-value 
of that timestamp is then included in the timestamp of the next block and digitally signed (Yanga 
et al. 2018). In a situation where 2 blocks are created and published at the same time with both 
pointing to the same preceding block, this results to a fork, where the blockchain separates into 
two branches (Liu et al. 2017). This is one of the challenges faced in blockchain technologies. 
2.5 Blockchain security 
In general, no practical cryptosytem has been capable of being rigorously shown to have a perfect 
or unconditional security and this is inherently a core characteristic of any technology which 
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depends on cryptographic solution. According to Stefan Wolf (1997), “computational security can 
only exist under certain assumptions”, which includes limitations of computing power and 
difficulty of underlying cryptographic problem to be solved. Blockchain technology itself, has 
inherent security risks (Dai et al., 2017). The security basically depends on a lot of factors 
including and not limited to how the network itself is setup, how consensus is obtained within the 
nodes, how transactions are signed, time-stamped and verified, how the reward systems are setup 
such as for Bitcoin miners, and of course the physical security itself considering users have private 
keys which sometimes are not stored securely. In this thesis, the focus will be on the digital signing 
process, the time stamping techniques employed, and the hash functions utilised in order to provide 
a fairly deep analysis, as these are core to the technical and cryptographic security of blockchain 
technologies. 
▪ Digital signatures: As pointed out by Wolf (1997), a digital signature scheme is a means 
of safeguarding integrity of messages, whereby a sender digitally sign messages using a 
secret key before sending, as this can be verified by the recipients with the sender’s shared 
public key. Similarly, Zhou et al. (2006) studies describes digital signatures as a 
cryptographic evidence which cannot be denied. They are an essential part of most practical 
security implementations and in general, most of these implementations are based on the 
difficulty of numerical factoring problems or discrete logarithm mathematical problems. 
In recent times, there has been implementations utilizing lattice problems to counter 
quantum computing (Howe et al., 2015). 
▪  Time stamping and Consensus techniques: According to Satoshi Nakamoto (2009), 
digital signatures, time stamping, and consensus algorithms are intricately linked. In 
general, blockchain transactions, such as Bitcoin transactions, are time-stamped by using 
a hash-based consensus to chain them together making it difficult to change the  
transaction, and this would then necessitate having to perform the complicated calculations, 
that is, the hashes for all the chained blocks all over to have a proof of work and somehow 
still remain the longest chain in the network. Similarly, Mingxiao et al. (2017) highlighted 
the importance of consensus and timestamping as a means of addressing the issues of 
double spending and colluding nodes. They also identified and described some of the major 
consensus algorithms, the most common ones being proof-of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake 
(PoS), practical byzantine fault tolerance and delegated-proof-of-stake (DPoS). As Li et al. 
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(2018) states so simply in their literary work, the key difference between PoS and PoW is 
that a PoW scheme establishes the credibility of a transaction or data block by utilizing the 
solution of cryptographic puzzles while PoS schemes largely depend on a proof of 
ownership for establishing credibility. There is a need for consensus schemes to keep 
participants honest. A good example being schemes like PoW and DPoS, which propels or 
motivates participants to avoid bias by creating a high level of competition for the right to 
produce the next block in the chain.   
▪ Hash functions and Collisions: It can be seen from the earlier sections in this writeup 
how important hashes are to the security of blockchain technology.  In the simplest form, 
a hash function is simply a one-way function which takes an input A and transforms it into 
a fixed length output B, that is, 𝑨 ⟹ 𝒇 (𝑨 ) ⟹ 𝑩, while collisions are simply rare cases 
where different inputs end up having the same hashed output.  According to Chi and Zhu 
(2017), hashing techniques are basically used in transforming data into shorter fixed length 
representations, and thus have lots of applications in data storage especially, enabling quick 
database operations using short compressed hashes that are mapped to the actual data.  
They also suggested hashing techniques could be viewed from two perspectives which are 
data-oriented hashing techniques which they further broke down into data-dependent and 
data-independent hashing techniques; and security-oriented hashing techniques which is 
also broken down into cryptographically secure hashing techniques as used by digital 
signatures and public cryptosystems, and cryptographically insecure hashing techniques 
such as those used by domain name servers. In this thesis, one of the main focus is on 
cryptographically secure hash functions, and these generally have the characteristics of 
being collision-resistant and preimage resistant that is one way and not possible to get the 
inverse of the hash image (Chi and Zhu, 2017). Similarly, Gervais et al. (2016) explains 
that a hash-based PoW consensus algorithm involves finding a nonce value which when 
hashed with a hash of a previous block, produces a value smaller than the target value. 
Zhou et al. (2006) also indicated that the validity of digital signatures is managed using 
one-way hash-chains. 
2.6 Blockchain uses 
One of the things which so many different authors have tried to show a lot of times, is the fact that 
blockchain as a technology has had a huge impact in how transactions are being carried out and is 
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continually shaping it and could become an integral part of lives. There are so many applications 
of blockchain technology in various industries, which includes but is not limited to the few 
mentioned below. 
▪ Smart contracts: It is extremely difficult to talk about blockchain applications 
(particularly Ethereum) without mentioning smart contracts. As discussed previously, 
smart contracts are in a very basic description simply computer codes which enable simple 
business transactions based on a consensus algorithm (Sato and Himura, 2018; Letourneau 
and Whelan, 2017). Also, as pointed out by Pontiveros et al. (2018), one of the intended 
goals of smart contracts as in Ethereum, is to have “specialized reusable modules” which 
can form larger and more complex smart contracts and thus enabling a reduced blockchain 
size, and a lot of the industrial applications discussed subsequently are built upon the 
concept of smart contracts. 
▪ Logistics: In their work on digital supply chain transformation, Korpela et al. (2017) 
discussed how blockchain provides support to supply chain integration, and the security 
and effectiveness of supply chain transactions. They identified the application of smart 
contracts, time-stamping and blockchain ledger as the most important functionalities with 
which blockchain technology impacts the supply chain industry in addition to the security 
provided by digital signature and public-key encryption of transactions and data.  
▪ Internet of things and smart cities: Banerjee et al (2017) discussed about the application 
of blockchain in sharing of datasets and in self-healing of compromised or damaged IoT 
devices thus maintaining integrity. Similarly, Sharma and Park (2018) discussed the use of 
blockchain to maintain security in smart cities which are based on “intelligent, autonomous 
and distributed network infrastructure”. 
Some other notable applications include mortgages, electronic voting systems, digital identity and 
records, securities and many more (Ali et al., 2018). 
2.7 Blockchain and Quantum computing 
According to Howe et al. (2015), the emergence of quantum computers poses a huge threat to 
crypto-systems as we know it, as most crypto-systems are based on difficulty of discrete logarithm 
problems (DLP) or assumed “hard” mathematical problems such as factoring problems and elliptic 
curve cryptography; which would be easy to break considering the huge computational power 
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which quantum computers can achieve. This consequentially would impact every application and 
technology built upon the current crypto-systems available now, hence the rise of lattice-based 
computational cryptography. 
 Lattice-based computational problems are considered to be resilient to quantum reductions or 
quantum-computer attacks (Howe et al. 2015). These includes problems such as shortest vector 
problems and closest vector problems in the lattice environment. There are already practical 
implementations of lattice-based public-key encryption and digital signature schemes with lots of 
research going into lattice-based cryptographic concepts, such as functional encryption, group 
signatures schemes, identity and attribute-based encryption, and fully homomorphic encryption. 
In a slightly different perspective, Buchmann et al. (2009) compared the security and performance 
of a few lattice-based encryption schemes showing some example attacks and countermeasures.  
2.8 Cryptographic security assessment 
As expressed by Park and Shin (2017), estimating what is required in the security of an information 
system or technology is a complicated process as it often involves considering many conflicting 
criteria and a wide range of factors. Hudic et al. (2017) pointed out that having the appropriate 
metrics is one of the most essential building blocks for making any assessment on an information 
system asset. Hence, one of the goals of this research work is to understand what is important in 
blockchain cryptographic security and thus provide an artefact or framework which can be used in 
assessing the most important areas of consideration in blockchain security. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Aim of research approach 
According to Dresch et al. (2015), the research methods serves as a map and gear kit in the quest 
of solving a given research problem and needs to suitable to the problem. Due to the diverse nature 
of this particular area of research and its unique nature of still being in the early stages despite 
being built upon old concepts, there is a need for a qualitative and explorative approach to this 
research. Thus, this research focused on applying a qualitative approach to identify and understand 
important considerations to make when assessing a blockchain cryptographic security. 
Furthermore, the study aims to establish a model that can be adapted to varying contexts, which 
can then be used in assessing the factors that are important in the security of blockchain 
technology. 
3.2 Methodological considerations 
The choices made in a research approach and methods, go a long way in having an effect on how 
a research question is addressed. The relevance of such methods to the research problem and the 
scientific legitimacy should be considered during selection, and the most useful and effective 
approach should be selected (Dresch et al., 2015). 
  As indicated by Creswell (2009), secondary forms of research and data collection can help reduce 
a scope of a study in proportion to the time and resources available. Thus, one of the main forces 
driving the of utilizing a desk research approach in answering this study’s research question was 
the desire to develop an effective solution to the research problem in the most cost-efficient way 
possible, especially considering the topics discussed are all based on older theoretical concepts. 
  Additionally, this approach encourages the exploration of existing frameworks and hence 
building upon frameworks already established in literature. 
3.3 Research methods 
In related literary works, Gervais et al. (2016) extended Markov decision process to create a 
mathematical model, in other words a quantitative framework for analysing security and 
performance of consensus networks, while Bauspiess and Damm (1992), as well as Damaj and 
Kasbah (2018), qualitatively defined frameworks describing technical requirements which 
includes functional and security requirements for hash functions. While these provided a blueprint 
relevant and complementary to this research, there was a need to combine the desk research 
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approach to a case study methodology considering that there are so many applications of 
blockchain, with varying differences in their structural organization. Hence, selecting two case 
which sufficiently addresses major differences, helps provide a construct and overall case narrative 
which could be extended to other blockchain applications. 
  As postulated by Stewart (2012), one of the drivers of multiple case studies, is the possibility of 
discerning themes or success factors and failure factors common to the cases which can be 
generalized, and this complements the aims of this study. 
  Similarly, according to Andersen and Kragh (2010), case studies could be used in a theory-
building process to formulate, categorize and organize relationships between the cases being 
observed. 
  The two case studies selected for this research were Bitcoin and Ethereum, as these were the most 
popularly used cryptocurrencies with some amount of documentation available describing their 
functionality. The analysis of their inner structure, operations and algorithms was designed to 
represent the relationship between hash function implementations and blockchain operations, thus 
contributing to the creation of a generic theoretic model which can be tweaked according to the 
situation and context of use.  
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4. BLOCKCHAIN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Blockchain structure 
This chapter is aimed at providing an understanding to the inner workings of a blockchain. As 
stated in the chapter two, a blockchain is simply a distributed chain of data blocks in which each 
block is linked cryptographically to the block preceding it as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
                       Block 0    Block 1 . . . . Block n 
Figure 2: A Basic Blockchain 
 In a basic form, blockchain as a technology is quite similar to having this thesis work for instance 
as the blockchain, copied onto some group of friends’ laptops, such that the pages which would be 
the blocks in each copy, and are linked together with a mathematical function.  To add a new page 
to the thesis, one friend has to solve a certain riddle. If the friend is able to solve a particular riddle, 
he or she then broadcasts the new page chained to the previous pages, and if there are no longer 
chains of messages from other users already broadcasted and verified, then the user’s chain stands 
a chance of becoming the chain to be followed. 
 According to Zheng et al. (2017), a blockchain is just a sequence of blocks, such that each block 
has the hash of the previous block header contained within its header as well as a merkle-tree root 
hash, while the transactions in other words pending transactions and confirmed transactions of the 
last block are contained in its body. Though for some blockchain, such as Ethereum, the hash of 
the subsequent block in the sequence is also contained in the header. Generally, the first block is 
usually called the genesis block, and the transactions it contains are hashed according to a merkle 
tree structure, creating one Root merkle-tree hash which is included in its head to be passed to the 
following block (Yaga et al., 2018). 
 When a new user joins a blockchain network, it receives a full copy of the blockchain and its 
transactions, which means all the blocks created with their validated transactions will be copied 
Block-0 Header 
Block-0 Body 
Block-1 Header 
Block-1 Body 
 
Block-n Header 
Block-n Body 
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into the user’s system, and these blocks can be confirmed using the hashes, in other words the 
merkle-tree root hash and preceding block header hashes.  
4.2 Blocks 
In general, a block usually has the following components as shown in Figure 3.  
▪ A timestamp 
▪ A hash value for the previous block’s header 
▪ A merkle-tree root hash (ie a hash which is the summary of all transactions in the block) 
▪ A nonce value (used in solving the hash puzzle) 
▪ The current block hash value 
▪ The size of the block 
▪ The block version 
▪ The block’s number 
▪ The set of transactions contained in the block 
The header contains at least the first four components (timestamp, hash values for previous block 
header and merkle-tree root hash, and nonce value). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Block Header and Block Body Contents 
 
BLOCK HEADER                           
Timestamp                                      
Nonce Value                                
Merkle-Tree Root Hash 
BLOCK HEADER                              
Block-01’s Header Hash 
Value Timestamp                                      
Nonce Value                                
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BLOCK HEADER                              
Block-02’s Header Hash 
Value Timestamp                                      
Nonce Value                                
Merkle-Tree Root Hash 
 
BLOCK BODY 
                                                      
Verified Transactions 
 
BLOCK-01 
 
BLOCK BODY 
                                                     
Verified Transactions 
 
BLOCK-02 
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Pending Transactions          
Verified Transactions 
 
BLOCK-N 
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As illustrated in Figure 2, the verified transactions or data in a block are hashed into one single 
merkle root hash which forms part of the block header as well as the hash value of the previous 
block, and the contents of the block header are then further hashed into a single value which will 
be contained in the next block header. Essentially, the entire block is summarized into one single 
hash (Figure 4), which means any changes to the transactions would immediately make the hash 
value in the next block header to be invalid, and changes rejected-this helps in providing 
immutability to blockchains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Merkle Tree Structure for Data hashing for a block 
4.3 Blockchain transactions 
In the blockchain, new pending transactions which are the candidate transactions, are broadcasted 
to all nodes in the network as depicted in Figure 5. They wait in a transaction queue and if they are 
accepted according to the consensus requirements of the network, then they will be added as 
verified transactions in a block and the updated block or new block is published and distributed to 
all other nodes on the network. In other words, the first node which is able to solve the 
cryptographic challenge for a new transaction according to the nonce value gets to add the 
transaction to a block and publish the block. Then all other nodes will independently verify the 
validity of the transactions in the broadcasted block and update their ledgers. If there are any 
discrepancies or invalid transactions, the block would be rejected, else it would be accepted and 
added to the network. 
Hash 1,2 
Hash 1 Hash 2 Hash 3 Hash 4 
Hash 3,4 
Hash 1,2,3,4 (Merkle Tree Root Hash) 
Tx/Data 2 Tx/Data 3 Tx/Data 4 Tx/Data 1 
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Figure 5: “Node A” broadcasting a candidate transaction (“N+1”) to other nodes for validation 
All other nodes would abandon their previous attempts to solving the cryptographic puzzle, and 
subsequently resume efforts on adding another block to the new chain which was broadcasted. If 
two nodes happen to broadcast at the same time, a “fork” is established in the chain, and the nodes 
in the blockchain network will then proceed with the chain which eventually has the longest chain 
(larger amounts of blocks) and disregard the chain which becomes shorter. 
 Each transaction is digitally signed (signed with private keys) using an asymmetric-key 
cryptography usually elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, and hence can be verified utilizing 
corresponding public key this has a huge impact on the idea of accountability in blockchains 
(Zheng et al., 2017; Yaga et al., 2018). 
4.3.1 Immutability 
As mentioned above, any changes in a block, even the slightest change in a single bit would 
necessitate changing all the subsequent blocks, and this has to be done at a faster rate than the 
Verified Transactions: 
Transaction 1    
Transaction 2 … 
Transaction “N” 
Pending Transactions:  
Transaction “N+1” 
 
NODE A:    Block X 
Other Nodes…. 
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entire network combined, which stretches the limits of possibility. This is one of the main 
advantages offered by blockchain technologies and is made possible by hashing.  
 In a basic form, how hashing works is that in 512 SHA for example, a hash of the number “7” is: 
“F05210C5B4263F0EC4C3995BDAB458D81D3953F354A9109520F159DB1E8800BCD45B9
7C56DCE90A1FC27AB03E0B8A9AF8673747023C406299374116D6F966981”; 
While that of “Cryptography is an interesting subject – account number 0000011149 etc@5” 
would be: 
“A8EBFA6CA38D48A08DF834C143C3D6F7218A9FC85BF30DC3607CD468227A9F77BF5
32844BA66218DEF74B26FC8134DFDC297A66C504C27ED93062F5DE05AF4FF”. 
Both hashes are of a fixed size and length, and the same strings will continue producing the same 
hashes, so it is easy to verify but difficult to reverse the hash back to obtain the strings especially 
because it is of a fixed length with either some compressions or paddings. This importantly makes 
accessing blocks or data operation on blocks possible in almost a linear time complexity of 𝛉 (𝒏) 
with respect to the content length (Chi and Zhu, 2017). 
  The idea of immutability of blockchain stems from the fact there exists a consensus among all 
nodes on what data exists in the blockchain, which means each node in the blockchain has the 
same copy of blocks. Hence for a malicious user to change the contents of a block, he would have 
to compute and create more blocks than the longest chain already existing in the blockchain. This 
means having to compete against and outpace the rest of the network, which in practice is not 
feasible. This implies that the deeper a block is in a network, the harder it is the modify its content 
or reverse its transactions, which is why it is recommended to wait for at least three blocks (three 
confirmations) to ensure non-repudiation in PoW networks, and some cryptocurrency exchanges 
insist on six confirmations. 
4.3.2 Accountability 
The basic concept of accountability in blockchains revolves around the idea of immutability and 
digital signatures, as well as the notion that mostly transactions are linked to a particular node or 
address on the network although the exact details of the identity might be hidden. It is important 
to mention though that blockchain solutions such as Monero and Zerocoin add extra layers of 
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obfuscations and anonymity; and avoid double spending. Zerocoin for example implement zero-
knowledge-proof-based validation of transactions, without having to expose any information about 
the transaction. 
The concept of accountability can be explored from the perspective of transactions and the 
perspective of regulations as enumerated below respectively.  
▪ As previously mentioned, blockchain technologies are usually built upon asymmetric-key 
cryptography and transactions are designed towards immutability, and this means for any 
transaction to go through, it would have been digitally signed with a private key that is not 
known to the public and can be verified with the corresponding public key. The transaction 
is practically indelible; hence to delete or modify it would have to involve changing all 
subsequent blocks in the blockchain. Consequently, in private blockchains for instance 
every node can be held accountable to all transactions they make. These transactions are 
transparent and the blockchain provides a single version of the truth across the whole 
network. 
▪ From the perspective of regulations, one recent and arguably most important regulation 
affecting the use and creation of data is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
and research work such as that of Neisse et al. (2017), suggests that smart contracts can be 
utilised in ensuring transparency and access of data. In other words, organizations can be 
held accountable to usage of data, through the implementation of auditable smart contracts. 
4.3.3 Privacy and Anonymity 
It seems strange talking about transparency and privacy or anonymity simultaneously, but 
regardless this is one key feature blockchain offers. In most cases especially in cryptocurrencies, 
the public addresses of nodes are usually a hashed value of the public keys, which do not reveal 
the true identity details of the node to all on the network. This allows nodes to be entirely 
transparent in the transactions while maintaining their anonymity and/or their privacy in terms of 
their identity.  
  As discussed by Khalilov and Levi (2018), anonymity can be regarded as hiding “who”, in other 
words the details of the owner of a transaction while privacy can be seen from a contextual 
viewpoint, that is, hiding the context of the transaction. For example, when nodes have a hashed 
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value of the data in a transaction, it is transparent to all nodes that the transaction took place, and 
which public address the transaction is linked to. For instance, the digital address or name of the 
node on the network can be seen, but not the exact context in which the transaction was carried out 
nor the actual details of who made the transaction in the real world. This explains why 
cryptocurrencies have been known to be used for illicit purposes in the dark world such as the 
darknet market “silk road” (Mehta et al., 2017). Though cryptocurrencies do not provide a 
complete anonymity, considering the IP addresses can be stored as meta data as well as time of 
transactions, and these transaction logs can lead to discovering identities when analysed 
holistically.  
4.3.4 Scalability 
Having discussed some of the merits of using blockchains, now it is imperative to also discuss 
some of the demerits. Scalability is one major challenge which blockchain technologies face. For 
instance, when it comes to cryptocurrencies based on proof-of-work consensus systems, the 
amount of energy required keeps increasing as the difficulty levels of cryptographic puzzles 
increases, such that it is bound to become unstainable at some point. In some cases, the amount of 
energy required to power one mining-pool (that is, a pool of nodes, mining and creating 
cryptocurrencies) is more than enough to power a small city or small countries (Vranken Harald, 
2017). Likewise, as it takes 10 minutes to mine one block in a bitcoin blockchain for example and 
150 seconds in Litecoin, the overall delay on the entire network could become exponential, the 
larger the chain becomes, and also the more data it contains.  
  In other words, the difficulty and requirements for bandwidth, computing power, storage 
memory, asymmetric-key management, and network complexity management all increases as the 
blockchain network increases. This will result to so many difficulties when utilized in an internet 
of things context with thousands of data transactions every second. To put it simply, one has to 
make a trade-off between scalability, security and decentralization as the blockchain increases due 
to performance optimization issues. There have been proposed solutions such as sharding which 
involves breaking blocks into pieces and sharing it across the network during the verification 
process, but these are still works in progress.    
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4.4 Forking and Double spending 
One other prevalent issue which comes with decentralized blockchain is forking, and this is simply 
a situation where two or more nodes publish a new block in a blockchain pointing to the same 
preceding block simultaneously. For example, if node X, node Y and node Z each publish a block 
(block X2, block Y2, block Z2) at the same exact moment, and the 3 blocks all have block A1 
(from node A for example) as their preceding block, then the blockchain at that moment has 3 
different forks from the penultimate block A1. In other words, 3 legitimate chains exist, and other 
nodes can add blocks to any of the chains. This obviously constitutes a huge issue as the 
transactions in the different chain forks are contradictory.  Usually, how this is dealt with in most 
blockchains especially cryptocurrencies, is that nodes add blocks to only the longest of the chains. 
This means adding blocks to the fork which increases the fastest and has the chain with the longest 
series of blocks agreed by consensus. All other forks are rejected and cut off, and subsequently the 
nodes with the removed forks can resubmit their transactions to a transaction pool waiting to get 
added to a new block in the valid chain (Liu et al., 2017). In Bitcoin, in order to avoid the entire 
blockchain becoming invalidated in an attack, the use of checkpoints was introduced which freezes 
the blockchain from the genesis block up to a particular predefined block (Alqassem and 
Svetinovic, 2014). 
  There is a direct relationship between forking and double spending, as malicious users can use 
the possibility of forks in coordinating double spending attacks in cryptocurrencies (Anceaume et 
al., 2016). Double spending basically is a phenomenon that occurs in a cryptocurrency when the 
same coin is effectively utilised in two different transactions. According to Mehta et al. (2017), 
during a double spending attack, an attacker can create two transactions, one bearing the address 
of a merchant or service provider as the output address and the other transaction bearing the 
attackers address (which is not broadcasted yet), with the intention of convincing the merchant to 
accept the transaction before publishing and ensuring the other transaction is confirmed and added 
to the blockchain by other nodes.  Attackers could also simply just try creating two blockchains (a 
fork), and this basically works in the attacker’s favour if the illegitimate transaction becomes the 
approved longer chain. In their work, Natoli and Gramoli (2017) demonstrated a 94% success rate 
in a double spending attack in a network simulation where they are able to disrupt communication 
between groups with a similar mining power. 
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5. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN CRYPTOGRAPHY 
5.1 Digital signatures 
According to Zheng et al. (2017), digital signing works in such a manner that every node has a 
private and public key. The private key is used in signing transactions and kept secret, then these 
digitally signed transactions are broadcasted over the network and they can be easily verified using 
the available public keys. One of the most commonly mathematical algorithms used in digital 
signatures is the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). 
5.1.1 Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm  
The ECDSA can be broken down into 3 main activities which includes the key generation, 
signature generation and signature verification. These activities are enumerated below.  
 
Step 1: Key generation  
 
Essentially, the outputs of the key generation are the public key Kpub and private key Kpr, and to 
generate this, the node or user who wishes to sign a transaction will need; 
▪ an elliptic curve E defined by y2 = x3 + ax + b over a prime finite field Fp with modulus p, 
the coefficients a and b, and a point A =  (𝑥𝐴, 𝑦𝐴 ) which can generate a cyclic group of 
order q (where q is a prime) 
▪ to choose a private key d from the integer interval [ 𝟏, 𝒒 − 𝟏 ] 
▪ and then calculate a new point B =  (𝑥𝐵, 𝑦𝐵 ), where B = d•A 
The public key then becomes the set Kpub = (p, a, b, q, A, B) while the private key is Kpr = k 
 
Step 2: Signature generation  
 
Having created the keys, the digital signature itself is the pair of values (r, s) where r and s are 
computed utilizing the point A =  (𝑥𝐴, 𝑦𝐴 ) created above, a new point R =  (𝑥𝑅, 𝑦𝑅  ) together with 
a temporary key 𝑲𝑬, and the transaction M to be signed and its hash in the following steps: 
▪ calculating the Hash of the transaction 𝑚𝐻 = HASH(M) 
▪ finding z the leftmost bits of the hashed transaction  𝑚𝐻 with bit length q 
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▪ choosing a temporary key 𝑲𝑬 from the integer interval [ 𝟏, 𝒒 − 𝟏 ] 
▪ computing the new point 𝑅 = 𝐾𝐸 × 𝐴 (that is R =  (𝑥𝑅 , 𝑦𝑅  ) ) 
▪ The first signature value r = 𝑥𝑅 (mod q) such that 𝑥𝑅 ≠ 0, if 𝑥𝑅 = 0, a new temporary key 
𝑲𝑬 is chosen. 
▪ The second signature value 𝑠 ≡  (𝑧 + 𝑑 × 𝑟 )𝐾𝐸
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞; such that s ≠ 0, if s = 0, a new 
temporary key 𝑲𝑬 is chosen. 
▪ Subsequently, the public signature pair becomes (r, s) 
 
Step 3: Key verification 
 
To verify the signature, the receiving node needs the public key set Kpub = (p, a, b, q, A, B), two 
auxiliary values u1 and u2, the pair (r, s), the inverse of s, that is s-1, the hashed message or 
transaction z, and a new point J that is J =  (𝑥𝑗, 𝑦𝑗  ), and these are calculated in the following steps. 
▪ calculating the inverse of s, that is w  s-1 (mod q); this means s•s-1  1 (mod q) 
▪ calculating a value 𝑢1 ≡ 𝑤 × 𝑧 (mod q) 
▪ calculating a value 𝑢2 ≡ 𝑤 × 𝑟 (mod q) 
▪ calculating a new point 𝐽 = 𝑢1 × 𝐴 +  𝑢2 × 𝐵 (that is J =  (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗  ) ) 
▪ Then the signature can easily be verified by simply checking if xj is congruent to r (mod q) 
or not. If it is congruent, then the signature is valid. 
 
The details of the steps above will not be proved in this literary work, but the following very simple 
example illustrates the concept explained. 
  Assuming the elliptic curve 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 2𝑥 + 2   /𝐹17 is chosen and a point A = (5,1) which 
generates a cyclic group of order 19, such that p = 17, a = 2, b = 2, and order q = 19. It is trivial 
to check and see that the elliptic curve satisfies the two conditions given in section 5.1.1. If Alice 
wants to sign a transaction which has a Hash value of 41, she generates the key set as follows. 
▪ She first selects a private secret key d = 11;  
▪ computes point 𝐵 = 𝑑 × 𝐴 = 11 × (5, 1 ) =  (13, 10 ), and makes  (𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑞, 𝐴, 𝐵) public 
Then she proceeds to generate the signature thus: 
▪ selects a temporary key 𝑲𝑬 = 8 
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▪ and computes the point 𝑅 = 𝐾𝐸 × 𝐴 = 8×(5, 1) = (13, 7) 
▪ this implies that r = 𝑥𝑅 = 13. 
▪ Then she computes 𝑠 ≡  (𝑧 + 𝑑 × 𝑟 )𝐾𝐸
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 ≡ (41 + 11×13) × 12 ≡ 4 mod 19; 
signature pair (r, s) = (13, 4) 
Bob the receiver can then verify the transaction thus: 
▪ He computes w the inverse of s (mod q); w ≡ 4-1 (mod 19) ≡ 5 
▪ Then he computes the two auxiliary values 𝑢1 ≡ 𝑤 × 𝑧 (mod 19) ≡  5 × 41 ≡ 205 ≡  15 
▪ and 𝑢2 ≡ 𝑤 × 𝑟 (mod 19) ≡  5 × 13 ≡ 65 ≡  8; 
▪ and the new point J = 𝑢1 ×A + 𝑢2 ×B; = 15×(5,1) + 8×(13,10) = (3,16) + (0,11) = (13, 7) 
▪ therefore, Bob can validate the signature since 𝑥𝑗 is congruent to r ≡ 13 
5.2 Hash functions and Collisions 
As explained in chapter four of this work, hash functions form an integral part of blockchain 
transactions. Consequently, the hashing process will be examined closely in this section. A hash 
function is simply a function which receives a message that is an arbitrary length of string as input 
and outputs a fixed length bit string, this output is usually called the message digest or hash value.  
Theorem 5.1 According to Smart (2016), a practical cryptographic hash function is required to 
have three main properties as highlighted below. 
▪ Preimage resistance: given a hash value “y”, it should be computationally hard (a 
mathematical hard problem) to find the initial message “x” from it such that  
𝑯 (𝒙 ) = 𝒚 
▪ Second preimage resistance: given an input x, it should be computationally hard to find a 
different input 𝒙| such that  
𝑯 (𝒙 ) = 𝑯  ( 𝒙| ) 
▪ Collision resistance: It should be computationally hard to find any two distinct messages 
with the same hash value. Thus, collision resistance implies second preimage resistance, 
but it does not guarantee that the function is a one-way function (preimage resistance) 
𝑯 (𝒙 ) = 𝑯 (𝒚 ) ;  𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆  𝒙 ≠ 𝒚 
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From the properties above, it can be seen that a collision is simply when two different elements 
in a particular domain map to the same element in a codomain. It is usually assumed the domain 
is larger than the codomain (Smart, 2016). 
  According to Yaga, Dylan et al. (2018), one of the most common hashing algorithms utilized by 
blockchain technologies is the secure hash algorithm (SHA) which has various families which 
includes SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2 and SHA-3. The SHA-0 (which was withdrawn and replaced 
with SHA-1), SHA-1, and SHA-2 families are based on a Merkle-Damgård’s construction of a 
hash function while the SHA-3 is based on a concept called sponge construction of a hash function. 
The members of each family are characterized by many factors such as their number of rounds, 
their internal state size, the block size they process, and the bit size of their message digest, in other 
words bit size of hash values and initial values used. For example, the SHA-256 has a 256 bits 
digest size and SHA-512 has 512 bits digest size. Also, SHA truncated versions exist in SHA 2 
family and others. In their work, Dobraunig et al., (2015) demonstrated practical collisions for 27 
rounds of SHA-512/224, SHA-512/226 and SHA-512 utilizing search tools and differential 
cryptanalysis. They also assert that these two truncated versions of SHA-512 perform faster while 
maintaining same security level and hash digest size as SHA-224 and SHA-226. 
  In this thesis, the SHA-2 (specifically the SHA-512 algorithm) and SHA-3 families and their hash 
process will be briefly discussed though not extensively. A more detailed description of both can 
be found in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (2015) Secure Hash Standard 
publication.  
5.2.1 SHA-512 algorithm 
Before introducing SHA-512 in this work, a few symbols and notations will be defined – these 
will be used in describing the hash function. 
▪ H(i) is the ith hash value while Hj(i) is the jth word of the ith hash value, where while H0(1) is 
the leftmost word of the second hash value 
▪ similarly, M(i) this ith message block while Mj(i) is the jth word of that ith message block 
▪ N is the number of blocks in a padded message 
▪ l  is the bit length of the message, while m is the bit length of a message block M(i) 
▪ w is the bit length of a word, while Wt is the tth w -bit word 
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▪ Kt is the constant value used for each iteration t in the computation of the hash digest 
▪ Then the following logical operations;  (bitwise AND operation),  (bitwise OR 
operation), ¬ (bitwise “complement” operation), + (addition modulo 2w), >> (right-shift 
operation), << (left-shift operation),  (bitwise XOR operation) 
▪ Lastly the following algorithmic operations;  
• ROTLn(x) which is the rotate left operation that is (x << n)  (x >> w - n) 
• ROTRn(x) which is the rotate right operation that is (x >> n)  (x << w - n) 
• and the SHRn(x) which is simply the right-shift operation (x >> n)  
where x is a w-bit word and n is an integer 0 ≤ n < w. Also, the ROTLn(x)is 
equivalent to ROTRw-n(x) and similarly ROTRn(x)is equivalent to ROTLw-n(x). 
The entire algorithm utilizes six logical functions which combines some of the operations defined 
earlier and is performed on 64-bit words (for example x, y, and z). The six functions are as follows. 
▪ Ch(x, y, z) = (x  y)  (¬x  z) 
▪ Maj(x, y, and z) = (x  y)  (x  z)  (y  z) 
▪ Σ0{512} = ROTR28(x)  ROTR34(x)  ROTR39(x) 
▪ Σ1{512} = ROTR14(x)  ROTR18(x)  ROTR41(x) 
▪ σ0{512} = ROTR1(x)  ROTR8(x)  SHR7(x) 
▪ σ1{512} = ROTR19(x)  ROTR61(x)  SHR6(x) 
The algorithm also uses a sequence of eighty 64-bit words as Kt which are K0
{512}
, K1
{512}
, … , 
K79
{512}
. For example, the first constant in hexadecimal form is K0
{512} = 428a2f98d728ae22. 
The SHA-512 algorithm can be basically broken down into two main stages: the pre-processing 
stage and the hash computation stage. 
The pre-processing stage involves padding the message to be hashed, breaking it into blocks 
subsequently and then setting an initial hash value. For a message M of l bits; 
▪ First, “1” is appended to the end of M 
▪ then k zero bits are also appended such that l +1 + k = 896 mod (1024) that is k = 896 – (1 
+ l) 
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▪ then a 128-bit block representation of l is also appended (e.g. 000000… l), thus making the 
entire padded message to sum up to 1024-bit 
 For example, to pad a message containing just the string “UCHE”, where ASCII 8-bit values of 
the characters are U = 01010101, C = 01100011, H = 01101000, and E = 01100101. Hence, the 
length of the message here is 8x4 (4 ASCII letters that is 4 bytes) = 32bits, and 1 is appended to 
the end of the message followed by a padding of 896 – (32+1) = 863 zero bits, and lastly a 128bit 
expression of l = 32 as follows; 
      “U”                “C”                  “H”                “E”              871 zero-bits       l = 32(that is 128 bits) 
01010101 01100011 01101000 01100101 1      00…00  00…0100000 
What this achieves is to simply transform the message block a multiple of 1024 bits, which enables 
subsequently parsing the entire padded message into N number of 1024-bit blocks (M(1), M(2),…, 
M(N)). Each block being 1024-bit in size which means each block is composed of sixteen 64-bit 
words (M0
(i), M1
(i), …, M15(i)). 
The hash computation stage involves using a set of predefined eight 64-bit words (H0
(0), H1
(0),…, 
H7
(0)) which are calculated using the first 64-bits of the fractional part of the square roots of the 
first eight prime numbers (e.g. H0
(0) = 6a09e667f3bcc908). These initial hash values are used in 
computing the intermediate hash values. The algorithm is described below.  
Each message block M(i) for i = 1 to N (that is M(1), M(2), …, M(N)), is processed in four basic steps 
– message schedule preparation; initialization of working variables used in permutating; 
permutation and mixing; and computation of intermediate hash values. These steps are carried out 
as enumerated below.   
 
Step 1: Message schedule preparation 
 
▪ Wt  =  Mt (i)  for 0 ≤ t < 15, and  
▪  Wt  =   σ1{512}(Wt-2 )  + Wt-7   +  σ0{512}(Wt-15 )  + Wt-16 for 16 ≤ t ≤ 79 
This means the first sixteen words are the words contained in the input array, and the next sixty-
four words are successively calculated utilizing the function σ (which is a combination of the 
different rotate functions). 
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Step 2: Initialization of permutation variables 
 
The variables used in the permutation and mixing (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h) are initialized using the 
following hash values: 
▪ a = H0(i-1), b = H1(i-1), c = H2(i-1), d = H3(i-1), e = H4(i-1), f = H5(i-1), g = H6(i-1), h = H7(i-1). 
 
Step 3: Permutation and mixing 
 
The variables, input words and hash values are mixed up and permutated using the functions Ch(), 
Maj() and Σ for t = 0 to 79. 
▪ T1 = h + Σ1{512}(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + Kt{512} + Wt 
▪ T2 = Σ0{512}(a) + Maj(a, b, c) 
▪ h = g, g = f, f = e, e = d + T1, d = c, c = b, b = a, a = T1 + T2. 
 
Step 4: Computation of intermediate hash values 
 
Lastly, the ith intermediate hash values are then calculated 
▪ H0(i) = a + H0(i-1), H1(i) = b + H1(i-1), H2(i) = c + H2(i-1), H3(i) = d + H3(i-1), H4(i) = e + H4(i-1),  
H5
(i) = f + H5
(i-1), H6
(i) = g + H6
(i-1), H7
(i) = h + H7
(i-1). 
These four hash computation steps are repeated N -times, which is after M(N) has been processed. 
Essentially, the 512-bit message input is expanded into a 1024-bit padded message (64-bits array), 
and this is then permutated and compressed into 512-bits. The output thereafter becomes a hash 
digest of 512-bit size (a concatenation of the eight 64-bits H(N) hash values (that is H = 
H0
(N)H1
(N)H2
(N)H3
(N)H4
(N)H5
(N)H6
(N)H7
(N)). 
5.2.2 SHA3-512 algorithm  
As mentioned in the previous section, the SHA-1 and SHA-2 families are quite similar, but SHA-
3 is based on a quite different concept – the sponge construction and KECCAK permutations. This 
section will be focused on describing the SHA3-512 in a shallow manner. Unlike the previous 
section, the SHA3-512 algorithm will not be described here, instead the goal is to briefly explain 
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what the main set of operations (θ, ρ, π, χ, ι) aim to achieve and point out the key concepts and 
major differences to SHA-2. The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (2015) Secure 
Hash Standard publication provides a detailed and lengthy description of this algorithm. Though 
just as in the previous section, a few symbols and notations utilized in this hash function will be 
defined first. 
▪ M  is the message or input to the SHA-3 function while N is the input to the sponge function. 
▪ w is the lane size (bits) of a KECCAK permutation, while l  is the binary logarithm of a 
lane’s size w. 
▪ Width b is the fixed length of inputs and outputs of a function in the sponge construction 
▪ Rate r is the number of bits processed from an input or output bits generated when a 
function is called in the sponge construction. 
▪ Capacity c is the subtraction of the rate from the width. 
▪ State is a three-dimensional array of bits which is updated during the KECCAK-p 
permutation and is usually a 5 by 5 by w array of bits which then consists of planes, slices, 
sheets, lanes, columns, and rows (Figure 6). 
▪ A[x,y,z] is a bit in the state array that matches the given triple (x, y, z).  
▪ θ ρ π χ ι are the five components or set of operations which a round of permutation is 
composed of. 
▪ KECCAK[c] is a family of sponge construction functions which uses KECCAK-p 
permutation as the underlying function and Pad10*1 as the padding rule defined for the 
KECCAK algorithm. 
▪ SPONGE[f, pad, r] is the sponge function which utilizes an underlying function f, a 
padding rule pad, and a rate r. 
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Figure 6: Structure of SHA3 “5 by 5 by w” state array of bits 
Source: (https://www.cryptologie.net/article/386/) 
The SHA3-512 algorithm basically involves converting input strings into 3-dimensional “5 by 5 
by w” state arrays, and then converting this state arrays back into strings after they have gone 
through some rounds of internal transformations and permutations. One single round of KECCAK-
p permutation is composed of 5 major sequential transformation operations in which the states are 
repeatedly updated internally as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: (θ, ρ, π, χ, ι) Round Transformations 
Source: (https://cryptologie.net/article/387/) 
These operations are formally called step mappings and are the following; (θ, ρ, π, χ, ι).  
▪ θ transformation: This receives a state array and XOR every bit in that state with the 
parities (the XOR summation of every bit in a column) of two columns from the array.  
▪ ρ transformation: This basically rotates the bit contents of every lane by an offset (which 
depends on the lane’s fixed x and y coordinates). 
▪ π transformation: This rearranges and reorders the positions of lanes in the array. 
▪ χ transformation: This basically produces the effect of a linear feedback register, in the 
sense that it XOR each bit in the array non-linearly with some other two bits in its row. 
▪ ι transformation: This is the only operation of the five that requires another input aside the 
state array, it also requires a value called the round-constant, which influences how some 
bits in a given lane will be modified. 
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 The idea is to take an input array, mix it up in a very complicated manner and then return an output 
string after all permutations, quite similar to how AES for example functions.  
The KECCAK-p[b, nr] transformation essentially receives a string which it converts to a state 
array A and applies these five transformational operations in the order 
 (ι (𝜒 (𝜋 (𝜌 (𝜃 (𝑨 ) ) ) ), 𝑖𝑟  ) ). This is iterated nr number of times, where 𝑖𝑟 ranges from (12 + 2l 
- nr) to (12 + 2l - 1). Then the resulting output is converted back to a string S. 
 On the other hand, the sponge construction basically takes the bit string N from the KECCAK 
permutation and a bit length d, pads it, then subsequently starts squeezing out output bits from its 
state, hence the name “sponge” as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Sponge Construction 
Source:(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221274795_Duplexing_the_Sponge_Single-
Pass_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Other_Applications/figures?lo=1) 
The SHA3-512 is thus in layers, the overall layer KECCAK[c] which results from the sponge 
construction layer which in turn depends on the KECCAK-p permutation layer. 
For SHA3-512; KECCAK[1024] (N, 512) = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24], pad10*1, 576] (N,d) 
5.3 Consensus and Time stamping techniques 
Time-stamping and consensus schemes are basically built upon the core fundamental mathematical 
functions above. 
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5.3.1 Time stamping 
The idea of trusted time-stamping simply combines the concept of digital signing and hashing. It 
arose from the need to certify when a document was created or modified, such that it cannot be 
backdated or forward-dated (Stuart et al., 1991). This generally could involve a centralized server 
(trusted stamping authority) or distributed nodes appending date and time to a hash value and 
thereafter digitally signing it, with each timestamp containing the preceding timestamp in its hash. 
This creates a chain of timestamps enclosed in one-way functions (Nakamoto, 2009). For 
blockchains, this means, a node takes a block of transactions it wants to publish after completing 
the proof of work, and digitally signs the timestamped hash value, before broadcasting, and it can 
be easily verified that the contained timestamped hashes are same across the network.  
That is recursively;  
Digitally Signed HASH [Digitally Signed (HASH (Transaction) + Timestamp)] 
The time is not an approximate value but is required to satisfy certain conditions give or take a few 
minutes before the current time. In Bitcoin for example, the timestamp can be accepted if its less 
than the network time with an addition of two hours, and greater than the median timestamp of the 
preceding eleven blocks. 
5.3.2 Consensus schemes 
Time-stamping as explained in previous section requires that the nodes of a network reach an 
agreement on the validity of the time-stamp, likewise block confirmations necessitates the need of 
such consensus. This is quite important in a decentralized system, due to the lack of trust in such 
decentralized networks, as Satoshi (2009) pointed out, a system for consensus enables the nodes 
to agree on a single version of history of transactions. There are quite a few consensus schemes 
available including those mentioned in the chapter two of this literary work, but in this section the 
emphasis will be on describing the two most popular schemes. 
▪ Proof-of-Work schemes (PoW): - This scheme is essentially used in deciding which nodes 
have the right to append new blocks to a blockchain and is more of a race of who can solve a 
puzzle fastest. First, a node obtains the difficulty level from the network which is based on the 
hash rate of the network, and then gathers all the pending transactions in the network following 
the last published block and creates a merkle root hash of these transactions. This is combined 
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with a 32-bit numeric nonce value (Mingxiao et al., 2017). The idea is to keep trying different 
values from 0 to 232 as the nonce value in order to obtain a merkle root hash digest which 
satisfies a given network condition, such as how many zeros the digest must begin with. It is 
basically a brute force attempt. The first node which is able to achieve this, then has the right 
to publish the block which other nodes can then verify it satisfies the given conditions. The 
difficulty level is adjusted every 2,016-blocks which takes roughly two weeks. 
For example, the SHA-256 digest value for string “Justin” is; 
“db2dc8cff5fe54243815a0252b8950a3769d87ca4bf8d6707ba4ca8b8db9435a00993ef1f4e2f2ac08
5d82c8a35f9247419923ed135a88baac086b0595f65c85”.  
Subsequently, the concatenation “Justin1245” could obtain a digest which starts with one 
leading zero; 
“0290461C3931C4CF3A3AFBEFD7884DEF3504FC20EA41B0B7E5A85F3F6C86CA32” 
or some other combination. While for the string “blockchain” and the nonce value 
“934224174”, that is, “blockchain934224174” results in a seven leading zero output; 
“0000000E2AE7E4240DF80692B7E586EA7A977EACBD031819D0E603257EDB3A81”. 
The difficulty lies in being the fastest to guess a nonce value satisfying that requirement. This 
is the reason why there are mining farms which break down the nonce values into intervals and 
share the workload as well as gains. 
▪ Proof-of-Stake schemes (PoS): - The PoS scheme in general is based on the hypothesis that 
the more stake a node has in a system the less likely it would attack the system. Hence, the 
consensus algorithm utilizes a variety of methods which includes random selection of users 
with high stakes, calculation of the value of a node’s cryptocurrency multiplied by the age of 
the coin or having the mining difficulty be inversely proportional to the age of the coins a node 
holds, and other stake-related methods. Thus, a node which has 35% stake for example would 
be 33% more likely to be selected than one with 2% stake (Yaga et al., 2018). 
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6. ASSESSING BITCOIN AND ETHEREUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
SECURITY 
6.1 Bitcoin cryptocurrency 
In this section, a closer look will be taken at a blockchain-based case study Bitcoin, with an 
assessment of Bitcoin’s cryptographic security in order to identify key considerations which can 
be generalized to other systems 
  The Bitcoin cryptocurrency is built on the blockchain technology and is heavily reliant on most 
of the concepts discussed in the previous chapter. The main components in the Bitcoin system to 
be discussed in this section includes the hashing algorithm utilized, the digital signature algorithm, 
the coin selection algorithm and overall flow of transactions. These are the fundamental structural 
components required.  
6.1.1 Inner workings and internal structure 
Typically, if for example Alice wants to send some Bitcoins to Bob in a transaction, the transaction 
input is basically a combination of various previous transaction outputs. This method of transaction 
is called the unspent transaction output (UTXO) scheme in which the number of transactions 
(Bitcoins) which would equal or exceed the total sum of what Alice wants to send to Bob would 
be used in generating the transaction, and any balance left would be returned to her. 
  In simplistic terms, a transaction in Bitcoin cryptocurrency involves a user generating a key pair, 
which consists of a public key and private key, with the address of that transaction being a 
representation of the public key (Alqassem and Svetinovic, 2014).  Subsequently, the transaction 
is signed with the sender’s private key which can be verified utilizing his known public key. 
Thereafter, each transaction is confirmed using a proof of work (PoW) consensus scheme and then 
encapsulated in a block which can contain one or more transactions. Any node or pool of nodes in 
the Bitcoin network in theory can create a block for any initiated transaction. This is done by 
solving a cryptographic puzzle, in other words finding a valid proof of work, and this process is 
called mining. 
  Typically, the node which succeeds in generating the block would have been the fastest node to 
create through a random search, a hash value of the block and its contents including previous block 
hash value, timestamp hash and merkel tree hash of transactions. This hash value has to satisfy the 
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network difficulty requirements specified by a randomly generated nonce value, such that the 
generated hash value would be less than or equal to a set network target. The mining node is in 
turn rewarded with some Bitcoins generated. 
  The first transaction in a block named the coinbase transaction or generation transaction permits 
claiming the block reward. It can only be considered spent after a certain number of blocks, due to 
the phenomenon of forking where multiple valid transaction branches could exist until the network 
trims it down by accepting the longest chain. Although, there are some wallet implementations 
which discard transactions that are less than a certain minimum threshold, these transactions are 
called Bitcoin dust. In other words, the mining fee for instance could be higher than the transaction 
amounts. While some wallet implementations also drop transactions with excessively high fees. 
These dropped transactions require being re-initiated (Alqassem and Svetinovic, 2014). 
  The conditions and criteria required for successful Bitcoin transaction as well as validation 
routine and hash of ECDSA public key are specified in a stack-based scripting language called 
script which is intentionally not Turing-complete (Khalilov and Levi, 2018; Bonneau et al. 2015). 
  It is important to note that an attacker in a cryptographic perspective in the Bitcoin context would 
have to compete against the entire network and would have to back track all previous transactions 
chained to the particular transaction being attacked. 
6.1.2 Bitcoin cryptographic algorithms 
The most relevant aspects here from a mathematical-cryptographic perspective are the hashing 
algorithms used, the digital signing algorithm and coin selection algorithm. These aspects are 
discussed below. 
▪ Coin selection algorithm: The dilemma of which coins (transactions) to select for use in 
a Bitcoin transaction is solved as knapsack problem. The goal of this knapsack algorithm 
is to select as input the coins which have the highest priority and minimize the number of 
transactions needed as input (Alqassem and Svetinovic, 2014). Details of the knapsack 
problem can be found in the work of Smart (2016), and cryptosystems have been built on 
this concept. 
▪ Bitcoin hashing algorithm: The mining process in Bitcoin as mentioned is based on a 
PoW scheme and this PoW algorithm called Hashcash is built upon the SHA256 hashing 
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algorithm. The SHA256 is a part of the SHA-2 families discussed in the previous chapter, 
though originally SHA1 was used in the very first Hashcash version, and then later changed 
to SHA256. The required property for Hashcash is a partial preimage resistance or one-
way functionality (Rudlang, 2017), and it uses two iterations of SHA256 to offer more 
resistance to hash collisions (the birthday attack), which is essentially SHA256 (SHA256 
(Block_Header)).  
▪ Bitcoin digital signing algorithm: Typically, the public key generated by a transaction 
initiator is hashed by Script using an ECDSA on curve secp256k1, and this hashed key is 
then propagated to the network (Bonneau et al. 2015). This ECDSA is based on the Koblitz 
curve which is a particular type of an elliptic curve, on which point doubling are efficient 
and curves with large order are easy to find (Bjoernsen Kristian, 2015). These ECDSA 
signatures are basically used to authorize Bitcoin ownership or transfer and are 
mathematically generated from the hash of the transaction.  
6.2 Ethereum cryptocurrency 
Ethereum came up as an improvement to the already existing blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. 
It essentially replaces Bitcoin's "longest chain" consensus rule with a "heaviest subtree" consensus 
rule. It similarly combines the concept of scripting and hash chaining but rather than a limited 
stack-based script, utilises a Turing-complete programming language. The aim was to develop an 
integrated flexible system which can be built upon to serve other functions such as smart contracts. 
Many transactions have a contract id linking them to one particular contract and due to the Turing-
complete language used, transactions can occur in loops. Thus, rules for ownership, and criteria 
for “unlocking” a contract can be written upon the provided foundation (Wood, 2017). 
6.2.1 Ethereum accounts  
While Bitcoin was built upon the unspent transaction output model, Ethereum is built upon an 
account-based model. This means an account is the building block and a transaction in this context 
simply means the transfer of information or “value” between accounts. 
  There are two general types of accounts which are externally owned accounts and contract 
accounts. Externally owned accounts are controlled by private keys in a manner is quite similar to 
the Bitcoin transaction and such that an externally owned account can initiate transfers by creating 
a transaction and signing it. While contract accounts are governed by a contract code (Vitalik, 
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2013). When a contract account receives a message, its contract code becomes activated and this 
makes it possible to store in the internal memory and thus be able to create contracts. 
An account basically has a nonce value which indicates the number of transactions issued from 
that address and is used to ensure transactions are processed only once or indicate number of 
contracts created by that account, an ether balance which is the basic currency unit of Ethereum, a 
contract code, and a storage. 
6.2.2 Inner workings and internal structure 
One important concept in Ethereum is the idea of computational limits known as Gas, which is 
quite relevant with Ethereum being based on a Turing-complete language which is capable of 
infinitely running loops. The values StartGas and GasPrice in each transaction indicates the limits 
to number of computational steps which can be executed and the transaction fee for each such step; 
hence if there is not enough Gas to complete a transaction. The transaction fees for already 
computed steps are deducted for the miners and the process terminated with an error message 
(Wood, 2017). 
  In Ethereum, though currently utilizing a PoW scheme, the use of a proof of stake (PoS) 
consensus scheme has been proposed and could take effect at some point in the nearest future. This 
would merge some PoW concepts with the requirements that miners or validators need to have a 
tangible amount of Ethereum locked as theirs in a master node, the age of these ethers and the 
amount. While this PoS scheme might favour those nodes who have more, it drastically reduces 
the power consumption required. 
Similarly, from a mathematical and cryptographic point of view, some main areas of concern are 
the hashing algorithms used and digital signature algorithms. Ethereum also utilizes elliptic curve 
cryptography for digital signing, while Ethereum’s proof of work function Ethash is built upon the 
Keccak-256 which is quite similar to SHA-3 hash function described in the previous chapter. 
In Ethereum's Keccak, the number of rounds in the hashing algorithm depends on the size of the 
lane. Randomization is achieved by the sponge construction and Keccak permutation, an iterative 
permutation process which includes rotating bits in a lane by a constant value, transposing lanes, 
and applying an S-box to rows. 
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One of the important factors is that the hash function is deterministic as the signature scheme 
utilises both a hashing algorithm in addition to a signing algorithm. Hence it is important that the 
function is injective making each hash distinct and also deterministic always providing the same 
output as a result of passing through the same state sequence. The hashing algorithm also aims to 
add collision resistance by using ASCII decimal encoding of the number of bytes in the word being 
encoded.  
6.3 Weaknesses and common attacks in cryptocurrencies 
Like most cryptography-based systems, Bitcoin and other blockchain-based technologies inherit 
the weaknesses in their cryptographic functions such as pseudo-collision attacks associated with 
SHA-2, side channel attacks, timing attacks, Shor’s quantum algorithms and computing attacks. 
 There are a lot of weaknesses in cryptocurrencies, which ranges from vulnerability of wallets, 
private keys theft or compromise, double spending, to energy consumption issues. In table 1 below, 
a brief description of some of the most common attacks against cryptocurrencies is provided (Conti 
et al.,2017; Bag et al.,2017; Gervais et al.,2015; Gervais et al.,2016; Apostolaki et al.,2017).  
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Table 1: Common attacks against cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrency attack Brief description of attack 
51% Attack(50%hash-rate) An attacker or group controls more than 50% of the network hashrate. 
Block Withholding attack An attacker in a mining pool hijacks and submits only partial PoW 
criteria. 
Finney Attack An attacker broadcasts a pre-mined block to use in double spending. 
Double Spending Attack An attacker uses the same coin for multiple transactions. 
Vector-76 Attack An attacker combines Finney and double spending attacks (multiple). 
Selfish Mining Group of attackers create and hide new blocks to create a fork. 
Wallet/Private Key Theft An attacker compromises the private key of users or steals their stored 
wallets. 
Time Jacking Attack An attacker speeds up clocks of majority of miners. 
Sybil Attack An attacker creates multiple virtual identities. 
Eclipse Attack An attacker tampers or delays the sending of transactions/blocks to a 
node. 
Deanonymization Attacks Anonymity issues due to coin history, resulting in linking IP addresses 
to wallets. 
Routing Attacks An attacker isolates a set of nodes delaying/stopping block propagation. 
DDoS Attack Hoarding network resources to deny users from services. 
Long Range Revisions 
Attacks 
Coalition of validators withdrawing their deposits and still using past 
supermajority to resolve fork/checkpoint conflicts. 
Slide Attacks An attacker tries to break down a cryptosytem into some rounds using a 
function and then analyses key schedules in order to exploit weaknesses. 
Length Extension Attacks Attacks which try to add some additional information to a given hash 
digest and produce valid hashed messages. 
Timing Attacks Typical cryptosystem attack where attackers try to analyse time it takes 
to perform a function or algorithm and thus gain some information. 
Pre-Image Attacks When an attacker tries to find a message mapped to a specific hash 
digest. 
Pseudo-collision attacks An attacker focuses on the state-update parts of a hash function and 
looks for a collision which can lead to breaking the entire hash function. 
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6.4 Blockchain hash function assessment framework  
In the previous sections, there has been an elaboration on the hashing algorithms utilised by both 
Bitcoin and Ethereum, specifically SHA-2 and KECCAK-256. Most activities in cryptocurrency 
processing and similarly blockchain usage relies heavily on hashing, this includes and is not 
limited to digital signing, consensus algorithms, and time stamping. Hence, the aim of this section 
and the core of this literary work is to analyse the needs of hash functions in blockchain and 
identify relevant security factors for consideration while taking into account complex requirements 
for performance. 
  The conceptual model for assessment proposed in this section, builds upon and combines some 
concepts from the models established in literature particularly, Damaj and Kasbah’s (2018) 
framework for cryptographic software and hardware implementation; Gervais’ et al.(2016) 
framework on security and performance parameter implications in PoW blockchains; and 
Bauspiess and Damms’ (1992) study on functional and quality requirements for hash functions in 
cryptographic applications. This conceived model focuses on a narrower perspective for 
blockchain applications.  
6.4.1 Relevant security factors and complexity attributes 
For a hash function to be used in a cryptographic-secure context, in addition to being easy to verify, 
and producing a fixed length output, it must be a one-way function. In other words, it needs to 
satisfy the preimage resistance (Smart, 2016). Though these are not the only factors considered 
when assessing hash function, these security requirements need to be balanced against 
performance requirements, as it would not be very useful to have a hash function which is quite 
secure but impractical to use. This is especially important when considering the limitations 
imposed by size and power in lightweight devices such as RFIDs. In this section therefore, a model 
which puts these different factors into consideration in assessing hash function to be used in a 
blockchain context is presented as in Figure 10, and in the order illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Factors to consider in Assessment 
STRATEGY COMPLEXITY 
ATTRIBUTES 
TECHNICAL 
DRIVERS 
KEY METRICS 
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First, as with any technology, choices and assessments are governed by and impacted upon by the 
strategic goals which is intended for that technology. Similarly, the factors which makes the choice 
of a hash function or its assessment more complicated and difficult, such as size limitations and 
power requirements are all considered and presented as complexity attributes. Lastly, the basic 
essential technical requirements and drivers are considered bearing in mind the strategy and 
complexities. Armed with these, suitable metrics and choices which will be most appropriate and 
fit for purpose can be made. 
6.4.2 Proposed assessment model 
This proposed assessment model is presented as high-level conceptual blocks of factors, under the 
four crucial categories mentioned above as shown in Figure 9. Typically, this applies to at least 
Ethereum and Bitcoin implementations but can be generalized to other blockchain-based 
applications and other applications which utilize cryptographic hash functions. 
 PoW-based blockchains Bitcoin and Ethereum considered factors such as partial preimage 
resistance and collision resistance, which led to Bitcoin’s use of two iterations of SHA256. This is 
also related to the use of randomization techniques such as Keccak permutations. Similarly, due 
to the use of their hashing algorithm in their digital signing schemes, it was necessary to have 
determinism and injectivity in the hashing algorithms. 
While Ethereum is more difficult to implement with ASIC (application specific integrated chips) 
chips with an increased memory requirement, Bitcoin with increasingly high mining hash power 
requirements favours the use of special ASIC chips and subsequently higher hash rates and 
promotes random search strategies. The dependency on special chips also impacts the choice of a 
hashing algorithm, as any change in a hashing algorithm for a blockchain could render the ASIC 
in use obsolete.  
  From a strategical point of view, the goal of the hash process will determine to a huge extent 
which factors can be overlooked in order to maintain a sensible trade-off between efficiency and 
security. In the same vein, the context of usage has a great weight on which criteria is impossible 
to ignore and determines the level of security required. 
  
44 
 
 
 
The main factors identified as complexity attributes in this model which have an impact on 
decisions regarding security requirements are as follows; 
▪ the hash rate which is directly linked to the amount of power being consumed continuously, 
▪ the memory storage requirement (size of digest and input) and their associated ASIC Cost 
(gate equivalents), 
▪ known weaknesses of core components and relevant known attacks, 
▪ computational power boundaries, 
▪ the ease of implementation and ease of obtaining the algorithm, 
▪ compatibility with differing machines, and 
▪ the hash calculation speed. 
Then, this is combined with the typical technical requirements of a cryptographic hash function 
which includes the following; 
▪ the hash function having collision resistance, preimage collision resistance and second 
preimage collision resistance, 
▪ the number of rounds used (a huge factor in pre-image attacks), 
▪ the usage of randomization elements, 
▪ having a fixed output size, 
▪ being able to handle input size of any length, 
▪ the absence of decomposition, 
▪ having evenly distributed preimages in output, 
▪ compression efficiency, and 
▪ the probability of collisions. 
  Subsequently, the key metrics presented are those criteria which regardless of the context should 
be satisfied by any hash function before it can be called a cryptographic hash function. Now these, 
depending on the usage, context and strategic needs, other factors can be added upon these. These 
includes but are not restricted to the absence of secret seeds which can result to slide attacks, 
having an efficient verification process, being preimage collision resistant at the least, being 
difficult to decompose into smaller functional units, having a fixed output size, having a low 
probability of collisions occurring, and having evenly distributed preimages in output.  
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Figure 10: Hash Function Security Assessment Model 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Blockchain-based applications are rapidly having huge impacts across various industries most 
especially the financial sector, and changing drastically how documents, contracts and information 
are handled in a lot of processes. These changes are expected to keep increasing as businesses 
realize the potential benefits associated with such blockchain-based systems. In the same vein, it 
is becoming increasing more important to focus a lot of research attention towards gaining a deeper 
understanding on how to make this transition better and help improve the systems in question. 
  The security of blockchain technology covers a broad range of topics which can fall into many 
different categories such as physical security, network security, internet security, cloud security, 
application security, data security and cryptographic security. This thesis focused on the 
underlying concepts which affects the cryptographic security of blockchain technology. These are 
mainly the hash functions used in transforming the data involved in transactions and making them 
extremely difficult to change, as well the digital signature schemes utilised in ensuring privacy. 
This focus on cryptographic security essentially cut across many areas simultaneously, particularly 
data security and network security by discussing consensus schemes and hashing algorithms. 
  This study has been focused on making this process of understanding the technology a lot easier 
from a cryptographic perspective for students studying cryptography. To provide a good 
foundation and starting point, a brief introduction to the mathematical notations and concepts on 
which blockchain is built upon was introduced, as well as an overview of the technology and its 
operations. Special attention was given to the two identified crucial blockchain building blocks; 
hash functions and digital signatures, with emphasis on the mathematics behind them. Based on 
the core blockchain principles, concepts, ideas and previous research, a model for assessing hash 
functions was presented. The outcome of this research helps provide guidance and direction in 
which factors one should consider when selecting hash functions to be used in a blockchain-based 
system.  
  The factors proposed in the generated model can be categorized into three main areas which are 
strategical factors, complexity attributes and technical drivers. When these categories of factors 
are combined in a particular context of usage, suitable metrics can then be extracted for assessing 
the hash function used. This research agrees with and build upon the works of Damaj and Kasbah’s 
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(2018), Gervais’ et al.(2016), and Bauspiess and Damms’ (1992) regarding frameworks for hash 
functions. The model provided is not constrained to blockchain applications, as it has relevance to 
any application and technologies which rely on hash functions. The most relevant factor is the 
context in which such assessment is being made, and thus how extreme the security restrictions 
should be.  
  There is room for improvement and further research on smart contracts in particular, as this is 
one major application in blockchain technology which is expected to have the most extensive 
impact in future. Currently, research is still ongoing as to implementation of a new proof of stake 
scheme Casper in Ethereum, and there are quite many limitations in the scaling of these 
blockchain-based systems, and this provides an opportunity for more research. 
  From a cryptographic security perspective, the two most relevant components of a blockchain are 
the implementations of hashing and digital signing, and the factors governing these 
implementations are dependent on the context. At the bare minimum, any cryptographic hash 
function used in a blockchain would be better equipped to deal with threats from a security 
perspective when there is an absence of secret seeds, uneven preimage distribution and varying 
output sizes, as well as manifestation of efficient verification of hashes, preimage collision 
resistance and a low collision probability. These provide a solid base for hashing applications. 
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